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REVERSING TIME’S ARROW: LAW’S REORDERING OF 
CHRONOLOGY, CAUSALITY, AND HISTORY 
Bruce G. Peabody* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
At the outset of his first term, President George W. Bush 
simultaneously disparaged and defended his immediate predecessor’s 
use of the constitutional pardoning power.1  Almost in the same breath, 
Bush did something far more remarkable and unsettling: he gave voice 
to a provocative way of reexamining the nature of time. 
In a January 2001 meeting with the press, Bush criticized former 
President Bill Clinton for essentially erasing criminal indictments 
against financier Marc Rich.2  But Bush also defended the presidential 
prerogative of issuing pardons.3  While he was “troubled” by Clinton’s 
decision regarding Rich, Bush asserted that: 
a decision on pardons, is inviolate, as far as I’m concerned.  It’s an 
important part of the office. I am mindful not only of preserving 
executive powers for myself, but for predecessors as well.  And that’s 
why I made the decision.4 
Taken at face value, Bush’s fretting about his impact on the powers 
of his “predecessors” (rather than “successors”) appeared based on a 
reversal of the standard sequence of cause and effect, and a somewhat 
 
* Associate Professor of Political Science, Fairleigh Dickinson University. B.A., 1991, Wesleyan 
University; Ph.D., 2000, University of Texas at Austin.  The author thanks Jack Balkin, Elizabeth 
Davis, Robert Houle, Seth Mnookin, and Andrew Polsky for their comments on earlier versions of 
this Article. 
 1. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President . . . shall have power to grant Reprieves 
and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.”). 
 2. George W. Bush, U.S. President, Remarks by the President in Question and Answer 
Session with the Press, (Jan. 29, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/20010129-7.html. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
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curious vision of institutional influence.5  We might understandably 
dismiss the President’s remark as a mere gaffe with no deeper meaning.  
But this Article urges us to use the President’s unintended comments as 
a prompt for reconsidering how we ordinarily talk about and conceive 
time and causality6―especially in thinking about law.7  Through a series 
 
 5. Had the President publicly worried about affecting the “political authority” of his 
predecessors, one might have charitably understood him to be rhetorically gesturing to his ability to 
tell or affirm a particular story of precedent―about prior executive use of the pardon.  Since 
“authority” implies exercises of power that can claim legitimacy from others, we could imagine that 
Bush might strive to preserve the influence of past presidents on the present by drawing a line 
between their (appropriate) use of the pardon and his own understanding, while casting Clinton as 
an aberrant figure.  Stated somewhat differently, Bush might legitimately claim to have some 
capacity to affect the authority of his predecessors in recovering a history of the pardon power, so 
that the examples and patterns established by past presidents would not be tainted by Clinton’s 
alleged misdeeds.  But, in emphasizing “executive powers,” the President arguably made a different 
and seemingly more dubious claim about his potential impact on the formal legal capacities of prior 
chief executives. 
 6. As indicated, this Article’s rethinking of traditional chronology and causation, while 
largely unfamiliar in legal scholarship, is not entirely alien to other fields.  As discussed below, 
some fields of physics do not insist that time can only be conceived as running one way―from past 
to present.  In the humanities, there is also some tradition of explicitly presuming that the present 
can affect the past.  See, e.g., T.S. ELIOT, Tradition and the Individual Talent, in SELECTED ESSAYS 
3, 5 (1950) (“[W]hat happens when a new work of art is created is something that happens 
simultaneously to all the works of art which preceded it.”).  See also JORGE LUIS BORGES, Kafka 
and His Precursors, in LABYRINTHS: SELECTED STORIES & OTHER WRITINGS 193, 195 (Donald A. 
Yates & James E. Irby, eds., James E. Irby, trans., 1962) (arguing that Franz Kafka created a set of 
“precursors,” or literary affiliates, who would not have been grouped and considered together 
without Kafka’s writings); DAVID LODGE, SMALL WORLD (1995) (using a character who employs 
postmodern literary theory to examine the impact of T.S. Eliot on Shakespeare, inverting the 
traditional lines of influence). 
 7. There is relatively little scholarship directly addressing the relationship between 
unconventional accounts of time and legal categories, topics, and problems.  See Rebecca R. French, 
Time in the Law, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 663, 663 (2001) (“Time is always necessary in the law, yet it 
is rarely examined.”).  There are some important exceptions.  See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & 
JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 124-27, 152-53 (2000) (discussing how legal narratives 
construct sequences of time); JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 3-5 (2001) (examining how constitutional interpretation is 
distorted by “the demand to live in the present”); Norman J. Finkel, Achilles Fuming, Odysseus 
Stewing, and Hamlet Brooding: On the Story of the Murder/Manslaughter Distinction, 74 NEB. L. 
REV. 742, 744 (1995) (discussing the merits of challenging the normal deployment of “time’s 
arrow” to give us “radically different ways of construing time, provocation, passion, memory, 
motive, action - and hence manslaughter”); French, supra, at 663; Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal 
Histories, in CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 79 (Allan C. Hutchinson ed., 1989) (reviewing different 
approaches to legal history adopted by adherents of the critical legal studies movement). 
 In political science, the recent flourishing of scholarship on “American political 
development” has induced somewhat greater self-consciousness of how time is conceived and 
ordered in political contexts. See, e.g., KAREN ORREN & STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE SEARCH FOR 
AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 1 (2004) (“[A]fter several decades during which history was 
relegated to a decidedly minor role in the study of American politics, interest in historical 
approaches is resurgent.”); PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL 
2
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of brief case studies culled from politics, culture, and law, this piece 
begins mapping the frequency, range, and significance of circumstances 
in which we can claim that the hands of the present grasp and transform 
the past.   
This seemingly peculiar reconfiguring of our temporal order is 
useful in helping us understand and grapple with distinctive features and 
problems inherent in U.S. law.8  Indeed, this Article contends that the 
American legal system’s common law foundations, as well as its 
formality and commitment to serving as both a constitutive and 
aspirational endeavor, make it especially conducive to meaningful 
reversals of the traditional path of “time’s arrow.”9  Among other 
 
ANALYSIS 8-9, 134-42 (2004) (discussing “historical institutionalism” in political science); Andrew 
J. Polsky, No Tool is Perfect: Periodization in the Study of American Political Development, 37 
POLITY 523, 523 (2005) (discussing how different “periodization schemes” assist scholars with their 
investigations of American politics). 
 8. This Article focuses on the U.S. legal system, but one might extend some of this analysis 
to other nations.  See Kwesi Baffoe, Cultural Eclipse: The Effect on the Aboriginal Peoples in 
Manitoba, 5 TRIBAL L.J. 2 (2004/2005) (discussing different cultural conceptions of time and their 
effect on the legal system); Brian Havel, In Search of a Theory of Public Memory: The State, the 
Individual, and Marcel Proust, 80 IND. L.J. 605, 620-31 (2005) (discussing how Austria used law 
and politics to construct, retrospectively, an “official memory” of Nazism). 
 Given the growth of international legal structures in recent years, and the consequent 
necessity of reconciling existing national laws and traditions with emergent international ones, the 
themes of this Article may be especially pertinent in analyzing legal relations between nations.  To 
take just one example, the Special Court in Sierra Leone has recently and successfully overseen 
criminal convictions against individuals who recruited child soldiers, finding them in violation of 
the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, which became effective in 2002.  DAVID M. 
ROSEN, ARMIES OF THE YOUNG: CHILD SOLDIERS IN WAR AND TERRORISM 147 (2005).  A ruling 
on May 31, 2004 upheld these convictions against the argument that they were based on prosecuting 
crimes that took place prior to 2002, and therefore, purportedly did not exist as a legal matter at the 
time of their commission.  Id. 147 & 181 n.40.  The Special Court countered that “the war crime of 
recruiting children under fifteen existed as a customary norm of international law even prior to the 
adoption of the Rome Statute . . . .”  Id. at 147.  While the Special Court claimed that “the Rome 
Statute merely codified, but did not create, this norm,” it seems equally plausible to argue that the 
Court reached into the past to create this legal norm, the existence of which the defendants denied.  
Id.  I thank David Rosen for pointing me to this fascinating legal debate. 
 9. The phrase “time’s arrow” is associated with Arthur Eddington, an astrophysicist who 
used the concept to “represent the apparent one-way property of time” with respect to Newton’s 
“second law of thermodynamics”―which observes that physical processes move in the direction of 
increasing loss or energy, that is, towards greater entropy.  Victor J. Stenger, Time’s Arrows Point 
Both Ways: The View from Nowhen, 8 SKEPTIC 90, 90 (2001).  Interestingly, modern physics does 
not seem premised on this view of time’s passage.  See PETER COVENEY & ROGER HIGHFIELD, THE 
ARROW OF TIME: A VOYAGE THROUGH SCIENCE TO SOLVE TIME’S GREATEST MYSTERY 23 (W.H. 
Allen 1990).  Newtonian mechanics and Einstein’s relativity theory, for example, “appear to work 
equally well with time running in reverse . . . . Uni-directional time, in fact, comes to appear as 
simply an illusion created in our minds.” Id. 
 Outside of theoretical physics, “time’s arrow” has typically been invoked to describe a more 
conventional view of chronology and causation and the seemingly inescapable flow of events from 
the present to the future.  See, e.g., STEPHEN JAY GOULD, WONDERFUL LIFE: THE BURGESS SHALE 
3
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benefits, greater awareness of this underappreciated aspect of American 
legalism can assist scholars and citizens in shedding new light on 
enduring and important debates involving such areas as constitutional 
interpretation and judicial confirmation hearings. 
II. REVERSING TIME’S ARROW? 
A. Different Ways of Ordering Time 
 Typically, we think of time as moving from the present into the 
future and, relatedly, we imagine that the things we do today plausibly 
affect what happens tomorrow.10  But there are other ways of ordering 
time and causality11 that are both familiar and important.12 
 
AND THE NATURE OF HISTORY 278 (1989) (discussing how prediction in the social sciences may be 
impossible given “time’s arrow of irreversibility”); Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Marbury at 
200: A Bicentenial Celebration of Marbury v. Madison: Marbury as History: What are the Facts of 
Marbury v. Madison?, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 255, 279 (2003) (“Time’s arrow, though beginning in 
the past, flies forward into the future.”).  This Article suggests that even these social, psychological, 
or subjective senses of time can be effectively reversed in some contexts. Cf. id. at 278-80. 
 10. See, e.g., Jerome Bruner, The Narrative Construction of Reality, 18 CRITICAL INQUIRY 1, 
6 (1991) (arguing that the mind structures reality through narratives defined by, among other 
features, “diachronicity”―a specific sequence of time). 
 To be clear, in seeking to reverse “time’s arrow,” this Article focuses specifically on the 
assumption that it is commonplace and uncontroversial to think of our lives as proceeding from the 
past to the present to the future―with seemingly no chance for the present (or future) to alter the 
past.  Scholars operating within the traditional model of the overall path of time have certainly 
offered different accounts of how time unfolds into the future.  Stephen Skowronek, for example, 
argues that presidential authority is both bounded and enhanced by the executive’s involvement in 
both “secular” and “political” time, but his work does not directly challenge an underlying 
assumption that time flows from the past to the future.  STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS 
PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO BILL CLINTON 30 (1997) (distinguishing 
between “secular” and “political time”). 
 Thought of somewhat differently, we might distinguish between the “flow” of time’s arrow 
(describing how time moves with respect to past, present, and future and the links between them) 
and the “direction” in which it points, that is, towards what outcomes or contexts.  See J.B. Ruhl & 
Harold J. Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of the Law In Modern Administrative States: Using Complexity 
Theory to Reveal the Diminishing Returns and Increasing Risks the Burgeoning of Law Poses to 
Society, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 405, 409-10.  As J.B. and Harold Ruhl argue: 
All complex dynamical systems have an arrow of irreversibility; their evolutionary 
processes cannot be put into reverse so as to re-create the past. Law shares this property.  
It unfolds as part of a sociolegal system that could no more return to a prior point on its 
path than could the weather be reversed.  Hence the weather and other complex 
dynamical systems, such as ecosystems, economies, brains, and, we posit, the law, all 
have their directional arrows.  The challenge is determining the directions in which the 
arrows point. 
Id. 
 11. See Michael Moore, For What Must We Pay? Causation and Counterfactual Baselines, 
40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1181, 1213-15 (discussing a “counterfactual theory of causation”). 
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We are accustomed, for example, to imagining and discussing how 
the past affects (and even effects) the present.  The famous epigram of 
George Santayana―“[t]hose who cannot remember the past are 
condemned to repeat it”13―is one of the more popular forms of this 
view of chronology and change.  But this positioning of time’s arrow is 
also embedded in specific social scientific theories, such as path 
dependency14 (which holds that prior individual and institutional 
decisions shape or foreclose present or future choices), and in legal 
concepts such as precedent.15  Indeed, some scholars have argued that 
 
 12. See STEPHEN HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME 139, 152 (1996) (discussing concepts 
of time in physics); HUW PRICE, TIME’S ARROW AND ARCHIMEDES’ POINT 3 (1996) (discussing 
themes such as “What is the difference between the past and the future? Could—and does—the 
future affect the past?  What gives time its direction, or ‘arrow’?”); Walter F. Murphy, Merlin’s 
Memory: The Past and Future Imperfect of the Once and Future Polity, in RESPONDING TO 
IMPERFECTION 164-172 (Sanford V. Levinson ed., 1995) (discussing “the problem of time” in law). 
 13. GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON OR THE PHASES OF HUMAN PROGRESS 284 
(2d ed. 1936). 
 14. See generally DOUGLAS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 99 (1990) (discussing path dependency); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” 
Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 434-35 (2002) 
(making the case that the Rehnquist Court’s federalism decisions reflect elements of path 
dependency); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 903, 925 (2005) (describing path dependency as presupposing “that what came before has some 
definitive or measurable effect(s) on what follows”); Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, 
Empirically Testing Dworkin’s Chain Novel Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 1156, 1170-71 (2005) (providing a general discussion of scholarly accounts of path 
dependency); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 
643-44 (1996) (discussing path dependence); Ruhl & Ruhl, supra note 10, at 414-15 (using the 
writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes to describe legal path dependency “in that, at any moment, 
law’s position along its path of change is the result of many prior choices of direction at forks along 
the way.”); Keith E. Whittington, Once More Unto the Breach: Post-Behavioralist Approaches to 
Judicial Politics, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 601, 616 (2000) (“Institutions are relatively persistent, 
and thus both carry forward in time past political decisions and mediate the effects of new political 
decisions.”). 
 15. As discussed, one view of precedent is that it represents our acceptance of being bound by 
past decisions in the present so that we might promote important legal “values” such as 
“consistency, coherence, fairness, equality, predictability and efficiency.”  Henry Paul Monaghan, 
Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 748-56 (1988); see also 
United States v. Washington, 872 F.2d 874, 880 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that appellate panels are 
“bound by decisions of prior panels unless an en banc decision, Supreme Court decision, or 
subsequent legislation undermines those decisions.”); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY 111-12 (1977) (arguing that judges attempt to bring their decisions into conformity with 
past precedent); Gerhardt, supra note 14, at 933-34 (discussing precedent in light of jurisprudence 
related to the Constitution’s Eleventh Amendment); Ronald Kahn, Interpretive Norms and Supreme 
Court Decision-Making: The Rehnquist Court on Privacy and Religion, in SUPREME COURT 
DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 175, 180-82 (Cornell W. Clayton & 
Howard Gillman eds., 1999) (discussing how judges are bound by the principles annunciated in 
prior judicial decisions).  Some scholars contend that precedent has minimal effect on the present 
day judgments of the courts.  See David Kairys, Legal Reasoning, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A 
5
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the signature feature of constitutionalism is its conceit that by binding 
ourselves during a moment of cogency and foresight, we can foreclose, 
or at least limit, the perils of future crises.16  As John Finn puts it, 
“constitutions, much like promises, are nothing less than attempts to 
fashion the future—to forge the institutional patterns and cultural 
folkways of political and social experience.”17 
We also readily conceive of ways in which judgments about the 
future can affect the present.18  In the legal context, judicial opinions 
often reference a responsibility to protect the rights and privileges of 
future generations.19  Jack Balkin has advocated that Supreme Court 
Justices seeking “greatness” should engage in a kind of “constitutional 
prophecy” based on articulating “a vision of the country and what it 
means . . . a vision of what America is and what its future and its destiny 
should be . . . .”20  Moreover, as some scholars have noted, popular 
“three strikes” legislation and similar habitual offender sentencing laws 
are premised on an assessment about the future dangerousness and likely 
criminality of a defendant.21 
 
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 11-17 (David Kairys ed., 1982) (questioning the power of precedent); 
Lindquist & Cross, supra note 14, at 1172 (arguing that the accumulation of precedent actually frees 
the hands of contemporary jurists). 
 16. See JOHN E. FINN, CONSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS: POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE RULE OF 
LAW 3-9 (1991); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[E]very institution 
calculated to restrain the excess of lawmaking, and to keep things in the same state in which they 
happen to be at any given period [is] much more likely to do good than harm; because it is favorable 
to greater stability in the system of legislation.”); John Harrison, Time, Change, and the 
Constitution, 90 VA. L. REV. 1601, 1602 (2004) (“But the present is the future’s past, and just as 
Americans operate under constitutional constraints created in past times, so they often create—and 
even more often consider creating—constraints that will operate in the future.  Every generation 
does some framing, changing the entrenched rules that bind ourselves and our posterity.”). 
 17. FINN, supra note 16, at 4; see also Harrison, supra note 16, at 1608 (“[A main reason for 
constitutions is that they are enterprises for] collective self-binding, the constitutional analogue to 
putting the alarm clock on the other side of the room to make yourself get out of bed.”). 
 18. See generally DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 357-61 (1987) (discussing, from a 
philosophical perspective, how we make decisions when taking into account their effect on persons 
who do not yet exist, but might exist in the future). 
 19. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) (“The future is [the 
distinctive] care [of constitutions] and provision for events of good and bad tendencies of which no 
prophecy can be made.  In the application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be 
only of what has been, but of what may be.”); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 124 (1866) 
(“[I]f the passions of men are aroused and the restraints of law weakened, if not disregarded—these 
safeguards need, and should receive, the watchful care of those intrusted [sic] with the guardianship 
of the Constitution and laws.  In no other way can we transmit to posterity unimpaired the blessings 
of liberty, consecrated by the sacrifices of the Revolution.”). 
 20. Jack M. Balkin, The Use that the Future Makes of the Past: John Marshall’s Greatness 
and its Lessons for Today’s Supreme Court Justices, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1321, 1335-36 
(2002). [hereinafter Balkin, The Use the Future Makes]. 
 21. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, WOULD YOU CONVICT?: SEVENTEEN CASES THAT CHALLENGED 
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But what, if anything, are we to make of the chronological disorder 
implicit in President Bush’s malapropism about the pardoning power?  
As indicated, this Article sets out examples from different aspects of 
American social, political, and legal life to suggest that the President’s 
inadvertent reordering of time is hardly alien to our ways of thinking 
about prior events and people.22  Indeed, American history is replete 
with episodes in which today’s decisions and priorities meaningfully 
alter what we regard as the past, and how this past is organized and 
understood.23 
B. Parsing Change: Interpretation and Amendment 
Students of law, history, and other fields may respond that these 
general claims are largely unremarkable.  Most scholars acknowledge 
that politicians and judges constantly reinterpret the past in light of the 
agendas, problems, disputes, pressures, and demands of the present 
day.24  As Walter Murphy has noted, we regularly “acknowledge that the 
present and the future may change views we hold about the past, 
[although] we nonetheless would reject the notion that the [present or] 
future can affect the past.”25  Many thinkers also concede that while we 
may attempt to recreate past decisions, environments, institutions, 
 
THE LAW 28-43 (1999) (discussing the case of William J. Rummel and the logic behind habitual 
offender statutes). 
 22. See infra Parts II.B, III. 
 23. It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss fully whether the United States is 
somehow particularly open to reversals of time’s arrow.  For some preliminary clues, see ROBERT 
G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 3-9 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2000), for an 
argument that American constitutional law is largely defined by our dualistic commitment to 
“higher law” and “popular sovereignty” (perhaps facilitating alterations of fundamental law by 
present generations) and RUBENFELD, supra note 7, at 3-7 for a discussion of how we are a present-
oriented people whose liberty still depends upon the passage of time. 
 24. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 5 (2004) (arguing that the indeterminacy of 
constitutional law allows for social and political forces to shape how it is interpreted).  Cf. Balkin, 
supra note 20, at 1333 (contending that the greatness of Supreme Court Justices “is a function of 
[their] political usefulness to later generations, not whether they conformed to currently fashionable 
theories of good legal craft and judicial prudence.”). 
 25. Murphy, supra note 12, at 171-72; see also David Lewis, Counterfactual Dependence and 
Time’s Arrow, 13 NOÛS (SPECIAL ISSUE) 455, 462 (1979) (“The past would be the same, however 
we acted now.  The past does not at all depend on what we do now.  It is counterfactually 
independent of the present.”); Ruhl & Ruhl, supra note 10, at 409-10 ( “[C]omplex dynamical 
systems . . . cannot be put into reverse so as to re-create the past.”).  But cf. Moore, supra note 11, at 
1230 (“Two of our bedrock intuitions about causation are that it is asymmetrical (if c causes e, e 
does not cause c) and that it has a one-way direction in time (causes must not succeed their effects 
in time).  An embarrassment for the counterfactual theory of causation is that, at least prima facie, 
counterfactual dependence does not seem to be bound by these limitations.”). 
7
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structures, or relationships, we cannot actually return to a prior historical 
moment.  As J.B. Ruhl and Harold Ruhl, Jr. argue, “[w]hen society 
wants to change the direction of law,” for example, “it can make a sharp 
turn towards the path that might have been, but it can not retrace its 
steps.  The path of the law is a ‘one-way street; it has an arrow’ that 
points only in one way, viz., from the past to the future.”26 
But this piece implicitly challenges these conclusions of Murphy, 
Ruhl, and other thinkers, by arguing for the capacity of the present to 
alter, in an enduring way, what we think of as past.  There is a category 
of circumstances―especially prominent in the field of law―where 
individuals and institutions in the present arguably go beyond mere 
reinterpretation of the past to actually amending it, producing genuine 
change not inherent in the preexisting political and legal order. 
This parsing of legal change is adapted from Sanford Levinson’s 
investigation of how many times the Constitution has been amended.27  
In dismissing the conventional answers (either 26 or 27) as “almost 
literally thoughtless,”28 Levinson distinguishes between legal 
interpretation and amendment.29  The former consists of ordinary, 
anticipated readings of the law, consistent with, or at least allowed by, 
what is “already immanent within the existing body of legal materials.”30  
Legal development or refinement through interpretation is “generated in 
substantial part by the [law’s] internal structure,” which remains intact 
after the change.31 
In contrast, an amendment consists of “a legal invention not 
derivable from the existing body of accepted legal materials.”32  It is an 
“extraordinary development” or even an “outright mutation generated by 
exogenous causes.”33  After an amendment, the old (legal) order does not 
remain intact―as Levinson puts it, the “preexisting legal reality” is no 
more.34  This Article seeks to identify instances in which this latter, 
stronger version of amendatory (as opposed to interpretive) change takes 
place, impelled by forces, actions, individuals, and institutions from the 
 
 26. Ruhl & Ruhl, supra note 10, at 416. 
 27. Sanford Levinson, How Many Times Has the United States Constitution Been Amended? 
(A) < 26; (B) 26; (C) 27; (D) > 27: Accounting for Constitutional Change, in RESPONDING TO 
IMPERFECTION, supra note 12, at 20-21. 
 28. Id. at 25. 
 29. Id. at 14-15.  In fact, Levinson eventually develops a more complex taxonomy of change 
including “revolution” and “revision.”  Id. at 20-21. 
 30. Id. at 20. 
 31. Id. at 14. 
 32. Id. at 16. 
 33. Id. at 14. 
 34. Id. at 26. 
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present operating on the past. 
C. Three Cases 
In the social and cultural case studies that immediately follow, this 
Article further explains, justifies, and grounds the counter-intuitive claim 
that the ordinary deployment of the arrow of time can be reversed.  In 
each of these episodes or examples, the present so transforms our sense 
of the past that it is difficult to retrieve our understanding of the past 
prior to this change. 
1. An example from university life 
Consider, for the moment, a “hypothetical” university.  Northern 
Yankee University is located in a major urban center on the east coast.  
Imagine that you graduate from Northern Yankee as an undergraduate in 
the late 1970s, when the university has a reputation as a regional 
commuter school whose constituency includes well-heeled students 
unable to gain admission elsewhere.  At times, over this period, N.Y.U. 
has trouble meeting its budget.35 
But over the next two decades, in part through the energy and 
leadership of a new University president, the school engages in a 
sustained, concerted, and successful effort to boost its profile and 
academic reputation.  From 1981 – 2001, N.Y.U. increases its 
endowment through a massive capital campaign, hires more and better 
regarded faculty, expands its campus size and resources, including its 
dorm availability, and becomes increasingly selective and 
geographically diverse.  By 2005, the school can lay legitimate claim to 
being a peer to its neighbor, Prestigious Ivy U.; indeed by some 
measures Northern Yankee is even more selective and competitive than 
PIU. 
As a graduate of Northern Yankee, you have experienced some of 
these developments in a rather immediate and peculiar way.  The attitude 
of friends and colleagues towards your degree (and intellect) has shifted 
over time from indifference or polite acknowledgement, to active 
interest, even admiration.  Prospective employers, who may have once 
passed over the subject of your education, now respectfully note your 
pedigree. 
 
 35. See William H. Honan, Buying Excellence: How N.Y.U. Rebuilt Itself―A Special Report: 
A Decade and a Billion Dollars Put N.Y.U. with the Elite, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1995, at A1 
(discussing the emergence of New York University as a national research institution). 
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What has happened to bolster the value of your academic 
credentials, earned over two decades ago?  The basic terms of your 
degree do not seem to have changed.  You have not, of course, somehow 
taken additional or more rigorous courses during the period of your prior 
matriculation, nor have you performed more adroitly in your completed 
coursework.  Your enhanced status does not seem based on an 
assumption that you have somehow utilized your past degree more 
effectively or sagely over time by, for example, carefully reflecting upon 
your completed coursework or the lessons learned. 
Instead, what seems to have occurred is that widespread, positive 
regard for your degree has flowered over time―reflecting, in part, actual 
changes in your graduating school’s profile, structure, and “outputs.”  
Stated slightly differently, relatively recent decisions and actions taken 
with respect to N.Y.U. have altered the character of your institutional 
credentials earned in years long past.36  In this context, the chronological 
disorder inherent in Bush’s worries about affecting his predecessors is 
anything but idiosyncratic; instead, it is as commonplace as the U.S. 
News and World Report’s annual educational rankings.37 
2. An example from professional athletics 
In December 1919, Boston Red Sox owner Harry Frazee sold his 
star player, George Herman “Babe” Ruth to the New York Yankees for 
$100,000.38  The Red Sox, previously the most successful franchise in 
professional baseball, subsequently suffered over eight decades without 
a world championship, while the Yankees famously went on to achieve 
baseball’s ultimate prize a record 26 times. 
One popular account of this turn of events holds that Frazee’s sale 
prompted the “curse of the Bambino,” a spell of misery that stretched 
from the Red Sox World Series victory in 1918 until their next 
 
 36. One should note that the effects of this shift could be quite material.  While essentially 
illogical, it is not difficult to imagine that one will have expanded professional opportunities based 
on the present’s burnishing of the past.  It is also not difficult to imagine these basic dynamics 
unfolding in a way that diminishes the value of a degree already earned.  See, e.g., Robert Strauss, 
Grade Point Angst At Princeton, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2005, at 14NJ (discussing Princeton 
University’s new, more demanding grading policy as an effort to maintain the value of a Princeton 
degree). 
 37. James Monks & Ronald G. Ehrenberg, U.S. News and World Report’s College Rankings: 
Why Do They Matter, CHANGE, Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 42 (analyzing empirically the impact of the U.S. 
News and World Report ranking of colleges). 
 38. GLENN STOUT & RICHARD A. JOHNSON, RED SOX CENTURY 145-47 (2000) (detailing the 
sale of Ruth to the Yankees). 
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championship in 2004.39  During the intervening 86 years, “the curse” 
supposedly induced critical miscues and untimely failures by Red Sox 
players, creating an insurmountable barrier to World Series success.40 
Reexamining the origins of the curse provides another example of 
how conventional chronology can be overturned by a contemporary 
narrative that effectively reconfigures the organization, meaning, and 
even content of historical events.41  The idea that Red Sox players, 
management, and fans were “cursed” by a longstanding pall created by 
Ruth’s sale did not actually find developed articulation until the 1980s 
and 1990s, when several sports columnists began retelling the history of 
the franchise.42  Prior to this period, sportswriters and fans did not 
systematically speak or think of themselves as tormented by a curse 
created by Frazee’s greed and Ruth’s vengeance.43 
But despite its somewhat recent vintage, the allure of the story of 
the curse transformed vital elements of baseball history.  For example, in 
the typical version of the oft told tale, Frazee’s blunder gave rise to his 
personal misfortune and financial ruin.44  In fact, after Ruth’s sale, 
Frazee continued to be a successful Broadway producer whose estate 
was valued at $1.3 million upon his death.45  Seen through the screen of 
the curse, the facts surrounding Harry Frazee and Ruth have become 
shaded. 
Additionally, a vital element of the “curse” legend that made it 
compelling for both friends and foes of the Red Sox was that it 
supposedly unified and intensified the pain of fans denied a 
 
 39. SETH MNOOKIN, FEEDING THE MONSTER: HOW MONEY, SMARTS, AND NERVE TOOK A 
TEAM TO THE TOP 46-48 (2006) (discussing the “Curse of the Bambino”); MIKE VACCARO, 
EMPERORS AND IDIOTS: THE HUNDRED-YEAR RIVALRY BETWEEN THE YANKEES AND RED SOX, 
FROM THE VERY BEGINNING TO THE END OF THE CURSE 130-32 (2005) (discussing the origins of 
the “curse”).  My thanks to Sam Mnookin and the Sons of Sam Horn website for some of the ideas 
in this discussion. Sons of Sam Horn, http://www.sonsofsamhorn.com (last visited Apr. 9, 2007). 
 40. BILL NOWLIN & JIM PRIME, BLOOD FEUD: THE RED SOX, THE YANKEES, AND THE 
STRUGGLE OF GOOD VERSUS EVIL 28-60 (2005) (detailing the supposed effects of the curse on the 
Red Sox misfortunes). 
 41. Adherents of the curse, for example, typically identify it as commencing immediately 
following the Red Sox 1918 World Series championship.  But Ruth’s sale only occurred after the 
infamous Black Sox 1919 World Series.  Thus, the traditional timeline depends upon Ruth’s hex, 
ostensibly triggered by his sale at the end of 1919, somehow working its black magic 
retrospectively for a year.  MNOOKIN, supra note 39, at 46. 
 42. MNOOKIN, supra note 39, at 46-48; NOWLIN AND PRIME, supra note 40 at 27-8, 52 
(tracing the curse to George Vecsey and Dan Shaughnessy in the 1980s). 
 43. MNOOKIN, supra note 39, at 46-48; NOWLIN AND PRIME, supra note 40 at 43 (discussing 
the birth of the curse in 1986). 
 44. STOUT & JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 147 (discussing the “long accepted interpretation of 
the sale of Ruth.”). 
 45. Id. at 148-49, 151. 
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championship through its power.46  But here, too, one should keep in 
mind that the “curse” was a relatively recent tale threaded backwards 
through time.47  Since the idea of the curse only achieved widespread 
circulation seventy years after it was supposedly initiated, Red Sox fans 
were not collectively immiserated under its terms; if the curse was in 
effect, it was so without a knowing audience.  But after the curse 
narrative took hold, it was sufficiently gripping and pervasive to 
transform the subjective experiences of the past―both as these 
experiences were chronicled by some journalists and even as they were 
recalled by many fans themselves.48 
3. An example from politics 
In his now revered Gettysburg Address (1863), President Abraham 
Lincoln attempted to honor soldiers slain on the field of war and redirect 
a nation sundered by bloody conflict.49  Lincoln’s famous speech began 
with an invocation of the past―specifically, a prior occasion of political 
(re)dedication, a previous moment when the nation’s leaders tried to 
account for America’s commitments and identity.50 
But Lincoln’s reference to “four score and seven years ago” 
bypassed what had been, alongside the elusive concept of “the Union,” 
the most prominent object of the president’s custodianship in previous 
speeches―the U.S. Constitution.51  Instead, Lincoln’s Gettysburg 
 
 46. See DAN SHAUGHNESSY, REVERSING THE CURSE: INSIDE THE 2004 RED SOX 2 (2005) 
(discussing how each Red Sox failure was compounded by prior “decades of misery”); LEIGH 
MONTVILLE, WHY NOT US?: THE 86-YEAR JOURNEY OF THE BOSTON RED SOX FANS FROM 
UNPARALLELED SUFFERING TO THE PROMISED LAND OF THE 2004 WORLD SERIES 15 (2004). 
 47. MNOOKIN, supra note 39, at 46-48. 
 48. See, e.g., SHAUGHNESSY, supra note 46, at 213 (discussing Johnny Pesky’s view of “the 
Curse”); MONTVILLE, supra note 46; NOWLIN & PRIME, supra note 40 at 51-52 (discussing fans’ 
perspectives on the curse). 
 One should note that many Red Sox fans undoubtedly believed that their team received more 
than its share of bad luck, and that the Sox franchise was ill-fated, even if they did not attribute this 
misfortune specifically to the “Curse of the Bambino.”  Since at least the 1970s (when an injury to 
star left fielder Jim Rice kept him out of the American League Championship Series and World 
Series), many fans began to think of themselves as being afflicted, and long-suffering―although 
more from the ineptitude of management than from some mystical curse dating back to Babe Ruth.  
See generally MNOOKIN, supra note 39. 
 49. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, ADDRESS AT GETTYSBURG, PENNSYLVANIA (Nov. 19, 1863), in 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, 1859-1865, at 536 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 
1989). 
 50. GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG: THE WORDS THAT REMADE AMERICA 79-89 
(1992) (discussing Lincoln’s use of the phrase “our fathers” and invocation of the past in the 
Gettysburg Address). 
 51. LINCOLN, supra note 49, at 536; see WILLS, supra note 50, at 38-40, 130-133 (discussing 
Lincoln’s views on the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence). 
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remarks drew upon the Declaration of Independence as the inspiriting 
touchstone of “a new nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the 
proposition that all men are created equal.”52 
One gloss on Lincoln’s speech is that it strove to reshape the 
republic, creating a “new founding of the nation, to correct things felt to 
be imperfect in the founders’ own achievement.”53  Lincoln 
accomplished this goal by circumnavigating the legal and political 
authority of the Constitution and its implicit support for slavery and 
injustice54―no small task given the Constitution’s self-declared status as 
“supreme law.”55  By invoking the Declaration, and its seemingly 
categorical embrace of equality, Lincoln told a new story about the 
origins and purposes of the republic, and indirectly built the case that 
only by ending slavery could the nation live up to its founding ideals.56 
In this way, then, the Gettysburg Address seems to have been a 
concerted effort to redefine the terms under which the Civil War was 
being waged, and to account for the “unfinished work” of the soldiers 
who filled the Pennsylvania battlefield.57  In claiming that the war’s 
underlying “great task” was to realize the principles of the Declaration, 
Lincoln performed what Garry Wills calls “one of the most daring acts 
of open-air sleight-of-hand ever witnessed.”58  His speech transplanted 
his audience into “a different America” and “revolutionized the 
Revolution, giving people a new past to live with that would change 
their future indefinitely.”59  Lincoln boldly reached from 1863 to shape 
not only the meaning of the past but the story Americans would tell 
 
 52. LINCOLN, supra note 49, at 536; WILLS, supra note 50, at 101-07, 145-47 (examining 
Lincoln’s views on the Declaration “as the statement of a permanent ideal” of American 
government). 
 53. WILLS, supra note 50, at 39. 
 54. Id. at 38-40. 
 55. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“This Constitution . . . . shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land”). 
 56. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 11-12 (1999) 
(discussing how the Constitution was supposed to further the commitments of the Declaration, and 
arguing that equality was one of these ideals). This project, of course, required some creative and 
nimble political reconstruction on Lincoln’s part.  See id. at 11-13.  As numerous commentators 
have noted, a strong case could made that protecting inequalities and “ascriptive . . . Americanism” 
has been a prominent part of our legal and political traditions, on par with our somewhat 
paradoxical impulse of realizing a liberal vision affirming the equal worth of persons.  See, e.g., 
Rogers M. Smith, Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America, 87 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 549, 549-50 (1993) (identifying “multiple traditions” in American politics 
including “liberalism” and “ascriptive forms of Americanism”). 
 57. See LINCOLN, supra note 49, at 536. 
 58. WILLS, supra note 50, at 38. 
 59. Id. 
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themselves about their national aspirations and the purposes of their 
internecine struggle.60 
III.  REORDERING CHRONOLOGY AND THE LAW 
As these cases suggest, in different areas of American social and 
political life, the present arguably impacts not only how we organize and 
make sense of the past and its significance, but also how we comprehend 
the very nature, content, and status of prior actions, institutions, 
commitments, and persons.  In the remainder of this Article I surface 
additional examples to develop a more specific argument that this 
seemingly reversed model of chronology and causation appears with 
some regularity in the field of law.  I further contend, this recurrence is 
both explicable and important.61 
A.  The Second Amendment 
Since the Reagan “revolution” of the 1980s, and with the 
concomitant rise of a sustained and politically successful conservative 
movement,62 the Second Amendment of the Constitution has received 
increased emphasis and given rise to a vibrant debate amongst scholars, 
citizens, and members of various interest groups over the meaning and 
scope of the amendment.63  Among other points of contention is whether 
the amendment refers to an individual or collective right, how far this 
right extends, and whether its ultimate objective is to promote self 
defense or a more sweeping “insurrectionist” right to resist tyrannical 
 
 60. See id. at 38-40.  Cf. Deborah Sharp, Deadliest Hurricane Began Century, USA TODAY, 
August 30, 1999, at A3 (reporting on author Erik Larson who notes that the Galveston storm of 
1900 was, unlike other calamities, “bleached from the national psyche” because it could not easily 
be incorporated into a narrative of American triumphalism). 
 61. The ensuing discussion of “reversed chronology” in the law is not meant to be exhaustive, 
but merely suggestive of 1) some of the more salient elements of law that arguably involve this 
dynamic, and 2) some of the features of law that make this temporal disorder likely to occur.  There 
are certainly other examples and explanations worth exploring.  Brian Havel, for example, has 
argued that states use a number of “public law devices” to create an “official public memory” based 
on “elite” memories and objectives, the latter including “social control and stability” and the 
suppression of alternate accounts of the past.  Havel, supra note 8, at 608, 689-90. 
 62. See Ted V. McAllister, Reagan and the Transformation of American Conservatism, in 
THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY: PRAGMATIC CONSERVATISM AND ITS LEGACIES 40, 40-60 (W. Elliot 
Brownlee & Hugh Davis Graham eds., 2003) (discussing the legacy of Reagan on the American 
conservative movement). 
 63. See Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 639-42 
(1989) (comparing popular discussions of the Second Amendment with a relatively limited judicial 
and scholarly commentary). 
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government.64 
Regardless of where one stands on the particulars of these issues, it 
seems reasonable to posit that ascertaining the meaning, impact, and 
even purposes of the Second Amendment cannot be divorced from 
developments since the eighteenth century.  As Daniel Farber has 
convincingly argued, analysis of the Second Amendment’s underlying 
rationale and legal reach is surely impacted by at least two crucial 
developments since the amendment’s inception: the Civil War (in which, 
as both a legal and political matter, the U.S. government ultimately 
quashed the efforts of the Confederate states to engage in armed 
rebellion) and the rise of the modern “regulatory state.”65  With this 
background in mind, we might cogently assert that these “recent” 
developments in our political expectations and national power can lay a 
legitimate claim to affecting the nature of a constitutional amendment 
ratified in the eighteenth century. 
B. Cruel and Unusual Punishment and the Eighth Amendment 
Like the Second Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, prohibiting 
the imposition of “cruel and unusual punishments,” was part of the 
package of legal protections included in the Bill of Rights.66  Since the 
early twentieth century, the Supreme Court has explicitly invoked 
attitudes and mores of the present in applying the clause to particular 
cases.67  In Weems v. United States,68 for example, the Court held that 
the nature of cruel and unusual punishment was not restricted to the 
views held by those who proposed, ratified, or even inherited the Eighth 
Amendment.69  Writing for the Court in Weems, Justice Joseph 
McKenna stated, 
 
 64. See Carl T. Bogus, The History and Politics of Second Amendment Scholarship: A 
Primer, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 3-25 (2000) (providing an historical narrative of different 
arguments about the meaning of the Second Amendment). 
 65. Daniel A. Farber, Disarmed by Time: The Second Amendment and the Failure of 
Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 167, 190-192 (2000) (discussing the impact of the Civil War 
and the rise of the modern administrative state on our understanding of the Second Amendment). 
 66. See PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
DECISONMAKING 5 (1992) (discussing the Bill of Rights). 
 67. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1014-15 (1991) (invoking precedent to 
affirm the Court’s commitment to viewing the “cruel and unusual” clause as evolving) (White, J., 
dissenting); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-101 (1958) (noting that the meaning of “cruel and 
unusual” is not “static”); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368-79 (1910) (discussing the 
meaning of “cruel and unusual punishment”). 
 68. 217 U.S. 349. 
 69. Id. at 368-79. 
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Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, 
from an experience of evils, but its general language should not, 
therefore, be necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore 
taken.  Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and 
purposes.  Therefore a principle, to be vital must be capable of wider 
application than the mischief which gave it birth . . . . The meaning and 
vitality of the Constitution have developed against narrow and 
restrictive construction.70 
Nearly half a century later, in Trop v. Dulles,71 the Court 
rearticulated this sense that the definition of “cruel and unusual” 
punishment derives not from “static,” past views, but the “evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”72 
More recently still, discussion of the application of the Eighth 
Amendment has centered around the death penalty, and the Court has 
consistently turned to the notion that contemporary views inform the 
parameters of constitutionally permissible punishments.73  As Justice 
Stevens wrote in Atkins v. Virginia,74 decided in 2002, 
[In recent years,] the American public, legislators, scholars, and judges 
have deliberated over the question whether the death penalty should 
ever be imposed on a mentally retarded criminal.  The consensus 
reflected in those deliberations informs our answer to the question 
presented by this case: whether such executions are “cruel and unusual 
punishments” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the Federal 
Constitution . . . . A claim that punishment is excessive is judged not 
by the standards that prevailed in 1685 when Lord Jeffreys presided 
over the “Bloody Assizes” or when the Bill of Rights was adopted, but 
rather by those that currently prevail.75 
Justice Stevens’ subsequent scrutiny of the contemporary actions of 
state legislatures and public opinion polling led him to rule that the 
decisive issue in the case was that a “national consensus” had developed 
against execution of the mentally retarded.76  In light of these arguments, 
 
 70. Id. at 373. 
 71. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
 72. Id. at 101. 
 73. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169-74 (1976) (discussing the evolution of 
interpretations of “cruel and unusual” punishment and the role of public perceptions in shaping that 
meaning); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989), overruled by Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551 (2005) (arguing that the Court, in construing “cruel and unusual punishment” looks not to 
its “own conceptions of decency, but to those of modern American society as a whole”). 
 74. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 75. Id. at 307, 311. 
 76. Id. at 316. 
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it does not seem unfair to say that the content of the Eighth Amendment, 
ratified in 1791, was determined by views and policy judgments 
developed over two centuries later. 
C. Constitutional (In)eligibility and Vice President Clinton 
Since 2000, legal and political commentators have, somewhat 
fitfully, engaged the question of whether former President Bill Clinton 
(or any other twice-elected president) could serve as a vice presidential 
running mate in a future presidential election.77  While this prospect 
generated consensus that it would create significant political obstacles 
for those occupying the top spot on this hypothetical presidential ticket, 
opinion was more divided on the question of whether Clinton was 
legally allowed to serve as vice president.78 
Those objecting to a Vice President Clinton on constitutional 
grounds traced their opposition to two sources: the Twenty-Second and 
Twelfth Amendments.79  Upon initial consideration, the Twenty-Second 
Amendment, which bars a person from being “elected” to the office of 
president more than twice,80 would only seem to prohibit Clinton (or any 
other twice-elected president) from seeking another elected presidential 
term.81  Thus, Clinton would appear to be free to run as vice president. 
 
 77. E.g., Michael C. Dorf, Why the Constitution Permits a Gore-Clinton Ticket, CNN 
ONLINE, Aug. 2, 2000, http://archives.cnn.com/2000/LAW/08/columns/fl.dorf.goreclinton.08.01/; 
Scott E. Gant & Bruce G. Peabody, How to Bring Back Bill: A Clinton-Clinton 2008 Ticket is 
Constitutionally Possible, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 13, 2006, available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0613/p09s02-coop.html?s=t5; Stephen Gillers, The Next Best 
Thing to Being President, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2004, A23 available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/03/opinion/03GIL.html?ex=1393650000&en=2667b709bb523c9
3&ei=5007&partner=USERLAND.  See generally Bruce G. Peabody & Scott E. Gant, The Twice 
and Future President: Constitutional Interstices and the Twenty Second Amendment, 83 MINN. L. 
REV. 565, 565-67 (1999). 
 78. See THOMAS H. NEALE, PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE PRESIDENTIAL TERMS AND TENURE 4-5 
(Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for Congress Order Code RS 20827, Feb. 26, 2001), available 
at 
http://lugar.senate.gov/CRS%20reports/Presidential_and_Vice_Presidential_Terms_and_Tenure.pdf 
(discussing the historical background of the Twenty-Second Amendment and the debate about its 
legal significance). 
 79. Id. at 5; Peabody & Gant, supra note 77, at 618-20 (discussing the relationship between 
the Twelfth and Twenty-Second Amendments). 
 80. The Twenty-Second Amendment to the United States Constitution states, 
No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and no person 
who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a 
term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of 
the President more than once. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1. 
 81. Peabody & Gant, supra note 77, at 565-66 (sketching the argument that the Twenty-
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But critics of the Clinton proposal argue that the Twenty-Second 
Amendment must be read alongside the Twelfth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution,82 which states that “no person constitutionally ineligible to 
the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the 
United States.”83  In this view, constitutional “ineligibility” with respect 
to the Vice Presidency is critically defined by the restrictions of the 
Twenty-Second Amendment; since Clinton was supposedly “ineligible” 
to the office of president, he was barred from serving as vice president as 
well.84 
Although this argument about vice presidential (in)eligibility is 
flawed,85 it serves to illustrate the extent to which some legal arguments 
implicitly assume that contemporary legal structures can transform the 
original content and significance of past law.  Whatever the Twelfth 
Amendment’s eligibility restrictions meant when it was formally 
approved in 1804, they presumably did not include the terms of the 
Twenty-Second Amendment―ratified almost 150 years later.86  
Nevertheless, arguments that Clinton is ineligible to serve as vice 
president seem based on an assumption that the ratification of the 
Twenty-Second Amendment altered the basic, initial terms of the 
Twelfth Amendment’s eligibility provisions; the claim is not that the 
Twenty-Second Amendment simply legally amended or supplemented 
the existing language of the Twelfth Amendment, but that it helped to 
define the very parameters and authority of the earlier provision.87 
D. The Fourteenth Amendment and Originalism 
Originalism, a theory of constitutional interpretation based on 
attempting to reconstruct and adhere to the intentions of our supreme 
law’s original authors, has been widely debated, defended as the best 
and even sole method for arriving at proper constitutional outcomes,88 
 
Second Amendment does not bar a twice elected person from again serving as president). 
 82. NEALE, supra note 78, at 4-5; Eugene Volokh, Bill Clinton for Vice-President?, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY, June 19, 2006, http://www.volokh.com/posts/1150738214.shtml (discussing the 
potentially relevant constitutional provisions that relate to this discussion). 
 83. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 84. Peabody & Gant, supra note 77, at 619-20. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See NEALE, supra note 78, at 4-5. 
 87. See id. 
 88. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF 
THE LAW 160, 167, 177-78, 351-52 (1991) (defending an approach to constitutional interpretation 
that relies upon the “original understanding” of the text). 
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and dismissed as an exercise in futility.89  Among one of the more 
seemingly awkward challenges facing proponents of this interpretive 
methodology is what to do with Brown v. Board of Education.90 
Although the Brown opinion is widely hailed as a morally and legally 
“correct” decision91 there is a widespread (but certainly not unanimous) 
sense that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, the constitutional 
provision at the heart of Brown, actually favored the kind of public 
school segregation at issue in the famous case.92  As John Harrison 
summarizes, 
[I]f American constitutional theory has a cliché of clichés, it is the 
argument over whether the general acceptance of Brown means that it 
is now unacceptable to interpret the Constitution according to its 
original intention or understanding.  The idea is that the drafters of the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not want to forbid separate but equal 
education, and more generally had no trouble with race-conscious but 
symmetrically discriminatory laws.93 
These issues moved from being grist for scholars’ mills to the 
forefront of public affairs in 1987, when Robert H. Bork (then sitting as 
a Judge on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit) 
was nominated for a seat on the United States Supreme Court.94  During 
 
 89. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 
204, 237-38 (1980); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. 
L. REV. 885 (1985). 
 90. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see BREST & LEVINSON, supra note 66, at 589-603. 
 91. Edward Whelan, Brown and Originalism, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, May 11, 2005, 
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/whelan200505110758.asp. Whelan writes: 
The [political] Left’s ‘killer’ argument against an originalist reading of the Constitution 
is that adherence to the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment purportedly 
would not have yielded the just result—the end to the evil of segregated public 
schools—mandated by the Supreme Court’s landmark 1954 ruling in Brown v. Board of 
Education. 
Id. 
 92. Compare RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 10-11 (2d ed. 1997) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment must be 
interpreted in light of the racial prejudice of its framers) with Michael W. McConnell, Originalism 
and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 953-54 (1995) [hereinafter McConnell, 
Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions] (challenging the view that the “originalist” readings 
of the Fourteenth Amendment support segregation), Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist 
Justification for Brown: A Reply to Professor Klarman, 81 VA. L. REV. 1937, 1937-38 (1995) 
(same), and Aviam Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger’s History, 54 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 651, 656-659 (1979) (book review) (criticizing Berger’s argument). 
 93. Harrison, supra note 16, at 1601; McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation 
Decisions, supra note 92, at 953-55 (discussing the problem of Brown and originalism, but arguing 
that the decision is consistent with the intentions of the Fourteenth Amendment’s authors). 
 94. BREST & LEVINSON, supra note 66, at 599; KEVIN T. MCGUIRE, UNDERSTANDING THE 
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his hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Bork was asked 
directly about his views on Brown, given scholarly contentions about the 
intentions underlying the Fourteenth Amendment and Bork’s stated 
position that “interpretation of the Constitution according to the original 
understanding . . . is the only method that can preserve the Constitution” 
and its underlying values.95  Bork’s response was cautious and studied, 
suggesting he had anticipated this line of inquiry: 
I think it may well be true . . . [that the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment] had an assumption which they did not enact, but they had 
an assumption that equality could be achieved with separation.  Over 
the years it became clear that this assumption would not be borne out 
in reality ever.  Separation would never produce equality. 
I think when the background assumption proved false, it was entirely 
proper for the Court to say “we will carry out the rule they wrote” and 
if [the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment] would have been a little 
surprised that it worked out this way, that is too bad.  That is the rule 
they wrote and they assumed something that is not true. 
. . . . 
By 1954 it was perfectly apparent that you could not have both 
equality and separation.96 
What does Bork’s analysis mean?  It does not seem unreasonable to 
recast Bork’s remarks as advocating for the following rule of 
constitutional interpretation: the Constitution is best understood as 
whatever its framers intended unless subsequent developments prove 
their background assumptions to be false, in which case an interpreter 
should adhere to a strictly textual reading of the Constitution.97  In other 
words, our understanding of the Constitution is dependent upon the past, 
unless the framer’s intentions and presumptions are proven false, in 
which case they can be modified by the present.  Even Bork, one of the 
most devoted adherents to originalism, seems to concede that the 
Constitution’s past meaning and content is contingent.98 
 
U.S. SUPREME COURT 18-21 (2002). 
 95. BORK, supra note 88, at 159. 
 96. Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United 
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 286 (1987) (statement of Judge 
Robert H. Bork). 
 97. See id. 
 98. See id.; Monaghan, supra note 15, at 744 (discussing the Legal Tender Cases and the 
Supreme Court’s validation of “paper” money despite the clear intentions of the Constitution’s 
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E. Creating Legislative Intent Ex Post Facto 
Bork’s treatment of Brown in light of the intentions of the framers 
of the Fourteenth Amendment points us to a related area of law in which 
we might again argue that the present can have a decisive impact on the 
past.  Courts frequently, and often without controversy,99 attempt to 
articulate legislative intent when interpreting statutes.100  Typically, we 
think of Congress passing a law with some more or less specific purpose 
outlined in the text of the bill that can also be traced to the debates 
surrounding the proposal and passage of the measure.101  Courts use this 
legislative history to fill in interstices in the law, and to understand, more 
generally, what the measure was intended to accomplish.102  If Congress 
disagrees with the courts’ construction of a federal law, it can always re-
pass the measure or otherwise clarify its intentions, correcting mistaken 
judicial understandings.103 
One might imagine that the relationship between Congress’s initial 
legislative intent and these ensuing efforts to apply or clarify these 
purposes is not difficult to describe.  Presumably, using Levinson’s 
vocabulary, these moves are either interpretations (carving out a 
meaning that is “immanent within the existing”104 legislative record) or 
evident (and presumably impermissible) amendments of an identifiable 
preexisting legislative intent.105 
There are sound reasons for believing, however, that in many cases, 
 
founders that “only metal could constitute legal tender”). 
 99. While, in principle, many legal commentators presume that determining legislative intent 
is defensible, there is certainly debate about the proper approach to this task.  See, e.g., Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the Judiciary, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 87, 
87-89 (1984); Peabody & Gant, supra note 77, at 614-17 (describing the problems of construing 
intent and using legislative history). 
 100. LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 175-76 (8th ed. 2004) (discussing statutory 
interpretation). 
 101. See AHARON BARAK, JUDICIAL DISCRETION 61-62 (Yadin Kaufmann trans., Yale Univ. 
Press 1989) (1987) (discussing “legislative purpose”); WILSON HUHN, THE FIVE TYPES OF LEGAL 
ARGUMENT 31-34 (2002) (discussing “intent” as a type of legal argument); DAVID M. O’BRIEN, 
JUDGES ON JUDGING: VIEWS FROM THE BENCH 213 (David M. O’Brien ed., 1997) (describing the 
“intent” of Congress and how it is determined). 
 102. See BARAK, supra note 101, at 60-67 (discussing the judiciary’s discretion in ascertaining 
and applying “legislative purpose”); Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 
in JUDGES ON JUDGING, supra note 101, at 230-236 (setting out arguments about the judiciary’s role 
in using legislative history). 
 103. See LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES 206-09 (1988) (discussing “statutory 
reversals” of court decisions). 
 104. Levinson, supra note 27, at 20. 
 105. As a normative matter, one might presume that most would regard the former practice 
(retrospective interpretation) as acceptable and the latter (retrospective amendment) as dubious, 
particularly when practiced by judges. 
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the judiciary’s ex post facto rendering of legislative intent and 
Congress’s formal clarifications of its purposes actually create a 
congressional rationale that did not exist previously.106  Members of 
Congress have sometimes contradictory and unformed reasons for voting 
for a bill.107  Given the diversity and complexity of Congress and its 
motives, and the length (or paucity) of its deliberations, and the 
subsequent confusion these conversations create, in many cases it may 
be meaningless to talk about a single, coherent, readily identifiable 
legislative intention.108  Such a purpose may only emerge after the fact, 
when a court or a later Congress explicitly and formally speaks to this 
issue.109  These later interpretations, however, cannot claim reliable 
access to (or status as) the prior, undiscovered intent.  Therefore, in 
some―perhaps most―instances, legislative intent will be fabricated by 
institutions and individuals temporally removed from the initial passage 
of a measure.110  Again, in this way, the past is only created in the 
future.111 
Consider a specific example.  Three days after the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001, Congress passed a joint resolution, an 
“Authorization for Use of Military Force” (AUMF), permitting President 
Bush  
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
 
 106. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 17-18 (1997) (“The practical threat is that, under the guise or even the self-delusion of 
pursuing unexpressed legislative intents, common-law judges will in fact pursue their own 
objectives and desires . . . .”).  This discussion calls to mind a joke about baseball. Three umpires 
are discussing their strategies to calling balls and strikes.  The first says: “I call them as I see them.”  
The second: “I call them as they are.”  The third umpire: “Until I call them, they aren’t.”  Jim 
Lindgren, Roberts’ Umpire Analogy is not Quite as Simple as it Seems, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, 
Sept. 12, 2005, http://www.volokh.com/posts/chain_1126668043.shtml.  The retrospective reach of 
the third umpire captures some of the dynamics found in this discussion of legislative intent, and in 
this Article generally. 
 107. See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION ON WAR AND SPENDING 63-67 
(2000) (discussing the varied and sometimes contradictory rationale guiding members of Congress 
in voting for the War Powers Resolution); Bruce G. Peabody, Congress, the Court, and the “Service 
Constitution”: Article III Jurisdiction Controls as a Case Study of the Separation of Powers, 2006 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 269, 313-17 (2006) (outlining the rationale of members of Congress in proposing 
legislation). 
 108. See Easterbrook, supra note 99, at 88-89 (discussing some of the problems of construing 
legislative history). 
 109. See SCALIA, supra note 106, at 16-18. 
 110. Easterbrook, supra note 99, at 92. 
 111. See JEROME BRUNER, ACTUAL MINDS, POSSIBLE WORLDS 158 (1986) (making a similar 
argument).  “[W]e cannot know an aboriginal reality . . . any reality we create is based on a 
transmutation of some prior ‘reality’ that we have taken as given.  We construct many realities, and 
do so from differing intentions.” Id. 
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organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 
11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to 
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United 
States by such nations, organizations or persons. 112 
Given 1) the fairly cursory and contracted nature of the discussion 
on the AUMF, largely carried out between the Bush administration and 
congressional leaders (“and not through the formal committee legislation 
review process”113), as well as 2) the near unanimity with which the 
measure was supported,114 and 3) the sense of urgency that was coursing 
through the nation at the time the resolution was considered,115 it is 
difficult to state clearly what Congress intended.116  Did the resolution 
extend to Al Qaeda, the Taliban, or to anyone who provided aid and 
comfort, even of an indirect form, to members involved with the 9/11 
attacks?117  Did Congress hope to focus solely on the September 11 
attacks, or a more general “war against terrorism?”118  Did Congress 
wish to expand the President’s ability to use military commissions and 
electronic surveillance through the AUMF statute?119 
These questions about legislative intent have been central to a 
number of legal struggles that have emerged since the law was signed by 
 
 112. Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
 113. RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN RESPONSE TO 
THE 9/11 ATTACKS (P.L. 107-40): LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 2 (Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for 
Congress Order Code RS 22357, Jan. 4, 2006) available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22357.pdf.  Grimmett writes:  
The leaders of the Senate and the House decided at the outset that the discussions and 
negotiations with the President and White House officials over the specific language of 
the joint resolution would be conducted by them, and not through the formal committee 
legislation review process.  Consequently, no formal reports on this legislation were 
made by any committee of either the House or the Senate. 
Id. 
 114. Of the 531 members of Congress voting on the resolution, there was only 1 “no” vote, 
with 12 members not voting.  See 147 CONG REC. S9413 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2001); 147 CONG REC. 
H5638 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2001). 
 115. 148 CONG. REC. S10145 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2002). Senator Hutchison stated:  
After the tragic events of 9/11, President Bush sought and received the authorization to 
use force to find and destroy the terrorists who had launched that heinous crime. There 
was no question in my mind and in the minds of most Members of Congress that our 
national security demanded our support of the President. 
Id. 
 116. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on 
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2079-83 (2005) (discussing the legislative debates on the 
AUMF). 
 117. See id. (interpreting the AUMF). 
 118. See id. 
 119. See id. 
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President Bush on September 18, 2001.120  In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,121 for 
example, the Supreme Court reviewed legislative history and other 
materials in ruling that Congress did not intend to use the AUMF to alter 
the rules governing military commissions found in Article 21 of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice.122  The Bush administration has also 
cited the congressional AUMF in defending a secret electronic 
surveillance program, essentially arguing that Congress intended to give 
sufficient power to the President to amend or expand existing 
eavesdropping statutes, such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act.123 
While courts and lawmakers have sometimes characterized these 
debates as being about whether Congress specifically intended to 
support the President’s actions with its AUMF measure,124 we have good 
reasons to believe that the search for this “original” legislative intent 
may represent a quixotic errand.125  The clearest articulation of the 
purposes behind the AUMF was provided by Congress (and the courts) 
long after it was passed into law. 
 
 120. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a) 115 Stat. 224 
(2001). 
 121. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 122. See id. at 518. The Court attempted to clarify the individuals Congress aimed at under the 
terms of the AUMF:  
There can be no doubt that individuals who fought against the United States in 
Afghanistan as part of the Taliban, an organization known to have supported the al 
Qaeda terrorist network responsible for those attacks, are individuals Congress sought to 
target in passing the AUMF.  We conclude that detention of individuals falling into the 
limited category we are considering, for the duration of the particular conflict in which 
they were captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an 
exercise of the ‘necessary and appropriate force’ Congress has authorized the President 
to use. 
Id. 
 123. See Neil King Jr., Wiretap Furor Widens Republican Divide, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 2005, 
at A4; Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 
Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001). 
 124. See, e.g., Tom Daschle, Power We Didn’t Grant, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2005, at A21 
(denying Vice President Cheney’s claim that the AUMF granted the President authority “to use all 
means necessary to take on the terrorists” and expressing confidence “that the 98 senators who 
voted in favor of authorization of force against al Qaeda did not believe that they were also voting 
for warrantless domestic surveillance”); Carol D. Leonnig, Report Rebuts Bush on Spying; 
Domestic Action’s Legality Challenged, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2006, at A01. 
 125. Among the plausible evidence for this view is the contemporary deep division over what 
the AUMF authorizes, notwithstanding the near unanimity with which it was passed.  See, e.g., 
Richard B. Schmitt, Senate Panel Sends a Mixed Message on Wiretapping, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14, 
2006, at A16. 
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IV. ACCOUNTING FOR REORDERED CHRONOLOGY IN THE LAW 
These examples suggest, in an admittedly cursory way, that law 
may be especially conducive to modes of analysis and decision making 
that allow the present to disrupt not only how the past is understood and 
evaluated, but also how we regard the experiences of past historical 
subjects.  The following discussion points to a number of features of 
American legalism that can induce this unconventional form of 
chronology and causation.126 
A.  The Nature of the Common Law 
Among its other relevant features, the common law127 reasoning 
marshaled by judges and justices relies upon an inductive process of 
deriving general, but sometimes quite specific, legal principles from 
prior cases.128  A vital step in this process occurs when a legal interpreter 
culls doctrine from a body of existing case law.  This inductive moment 
is crucial for several reasons: it determines which set of cases are 
consulted, establishes the framework through which these prior 
decisions are to be understood, and generates a new guiding legal rule 
(or at least modifies an old rule).129 
Understood in this way, the importance and even the meaning of 
cases cannot be known at the time they are issued, but only after they 
have been interpreted, applied, and linked with other rulings.130  Stated 
somewhat differently, the retrospective reach of common law reasoning 
includes a decision making process in which present judgments 
reconstruct the significance and authority of cases long past.131 
Consider an example from constitutional civil liberties.132  At the 
 
 126. As noted, while I emphasize American constitutional law in this discussion to keep it 
somewhat focused, much of the logic of my argument might be extended to other areas of law and 
other nations. 
 127. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 7 (6th ed. 1993) (describing the 
common law by contrasting “bench” and “bar” made law). 
 128. Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal 
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 604 (2001) (defining common law 
adjudication as involving “a causal relationship between stages in a temporal sequence, with each 
stage strongly influencing the direction of the following stage”). 
 129. See EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 8-27 (Univ. of Chicago 
Press 1949) (describing the process of common law reasoning). 
 130. See K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 61-77 (1951) (discussing the indeterminacy 
of the common law system); Hathaway, supra note 128, at 604. 
 131. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552-562 (1995) (drawing on the Court’s 
previous Commerce Clause decisions to construct a three part test for assessing the constitutionality 
of “commerce” legislation regulating private activity). 
 132. There is some dispute about the extent to which the federal courts can and have created a 
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time of its issuance in 1937, Palko v. Connecticut133 was arguably a 
constrained, even conservative ruling that actually denied the double 
jeopardy claim of a criminal convict; it hardly represented a revolution 
in the judiciary’s willingness to protect individual rights.134  But over the 
next five decades, Palko became a vital cog in the legal machinery that 
transformed the scope and application of the Bill of Rights.135  In an 
important sense, then, the Palko decision was only defined and 
completed as a legal matter by decisions that occurred long after the 
individual claims in the case had been settled, long after the opinion had 
been printed in the United States Reports.136  We might make similar 
claims about M’Culloch v. Maryland,137 Brown,138 Griswold v. 
Connecticut,139 and other “great cases” that serve as major precedents in 
our legal system. 
 
constitutional common law.  Gerhardt, supra note 14, at 941-46 (outlining differences between 
“constitutional” and “common law adjudication”).  Without delving into this controversy here, I 
simply note that American constitutional jurisprudence certainly shares some features of common 
law reasoning, such as a reliance on precedent and a refusal to render advisory opinions.  
Interestingly, to the extent that judges or justices accept the proposition that there is no 
constitutional common law, arguably, every time these jurists preside over a significant 
constitutional change they serve as a representation of the curious reversal of “time’s arrow” 
portrayed in this Article.  If there is no constitutional common law, then any judicial gloss on the 
Constitution is essentially an interpretation of what the Constitution actually says.  Seen through this 
paradigm, shifts in constitutional doctrine created by judges effectively change the content of a 
document written over 200 years ago. 
 133. 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled by 395 U.S. 784 (1969). 
 134. See id. at 328. 
 135. 2 DAVID M. O’BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 307-08 (2d ed. 1995) 
(describing the development of the Palko doctrine). 
 136. LLEWELLYN, supra note 130, at 52 (making a “distinction between the ratio decidendi, the 
court’s own version of the rule of the case, and the true rule of the case, to wit, what it will be made 
to stand for by another later court”); see also Levinson & Balkin, supra note 9, at 280 . Levinson 
and Balkin write,  
Understanding what a case means often requires recognizing what happened after the 
decision was entered.  This is so for two reasons.  First, the consequences that the case 
sets in motion often help us understand the practical effect of the case, and whether the 
decision was wise or ill-advised.  Second[,] the meaning of the case to later generations 
is produced by the later uses and interpretations of it, which continually reframe its 
meaning and significance in our eyes. 
Id. 
 137. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 138. Levinson & Balkin, supra note 9, at 280 (“Brown v. Board of Education has acquired a 
whole host of meanings in the fifty years following the decision: It has become an icon of equality 
as well as a symbol of both what courts can do and what they cannot do in promoting important 
public values.”). 
 139. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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B. Law as a Constitutive Enterprise 
Among other functions, law settles disputes, identifies rights, 
coerces individuals, and helps to identify binding, enforceable norms.140  
But, as a number of commentators have noted, law is also constitutive, 
in the sense that it makes formative statements about who we are as a 
people.141  Law tells stories about our identity.142 
This dimension of law invites a remaking of the past when our 
current perceptions change and we wish to refurbish the existing national 
narrative.  We reach into the past not merely to refine or amend our 
laws, but to “retell” the past in an authoritative way, on terms more 
favorable to our present sensibilities and judgments.143  Lincoln’s 
emphasis on the equality principles embedded in the Declaration serves 
as one dramatic example of this recasting of American ambitions and 
tradition.144  Legal institutions―and the decision makers who feed them 
life―frequently revisit settled judgments, at times in ways that 
effectively repudiate the terms of our past.145 
 
 140. ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 25-47 (rev. ed. 1954) 
(discussing the different “ends” of law). 
 141. J.M. Balkin, The Declaration and the Promise of a Democratic Culture, 4 WIDENER L. 
SYMP. J. 167, 180 (1999) (“Constitutional stories constitute us as a people with a purpose and a 
trajectory: They remind us what we have done in the past and therefore what we should be doing 
today.  They explain to us where we have been and therefore where we should be going.”). 
 142. See id.; AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 7, at 232-34 (examining how legal narratives 
contribute to the formation of our identity); HOWARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE 
SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 9 (1963) (“[S]ocial groups create deviance by making the rules whose 
infraction constitutes deviance.”) (emphasis omitted); W. JAMES BOOTH, COMMUNITIES OF 
MEMORY: ON WITNESS, IDENTITY, AND JUSTICE 125-27 (2006) (discussing the role of law, and 
specifically trials, in shaping national identity); ANNE NORTON, REPUBLIC OF SIGNS: LIBERAL 
THEORY AND AMERICAN POP CULTURE 11 (1993) (discussing how our constitutional traditions 
incline us to privilege a “written over a more corporeal identity”); Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent 
and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1066 (1990) (“We must respect the past because the world of 
culture that we inherit from it makes us who we are.”). 
 143. NORTON, supra note 142, at 10 (discussing how Abraham Lincoln used law to remake 
himself and forget his past). 
 144. See discussion supra Part II.C.3. 
 145. See Balkin, supra note 20, at 1337. 
Marshall, then, is great because he was a prophet of American nationalism.  If the history 
of America had turned out differently, if the nation had fractured as a result of the Civil 
War, or if America had never risen to the status of a great power—his star might not 
shine so brightly today.  Of course, that is always the case with prophets.  Most prophets 
are false prophets.  Their prophecies are discarded and soon forgotten.  Even true 
prophets do not always understand the full import of what they are saying.  That is 
largely because what they say is not true at the time, but is rather made true by later 
events.  Prophets are the servants of the future, and prophecy is one of the uses that the 
future makes of the past. 
Id. at 1338. 
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In recent years, for example, prosecutors have disinterred a number 
of criminal cases dating back to the civil rights era, resulting in 
indictments, convictions, and prison sentences for violent segregationists 
who had eluded the law’s reach for decades.146  These retrospective legal 
actions are partly driven by a sense that the fabric of our past historical 
and legal record needs to be mended or even re-stitched.147  In the early 
1960s, Byron De La Beckwith, a Mississippi Klansman, was arrested 
and twice tried for assassinating National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) field secretary Medgar 
Evers.148  Both proceedings resulted in mistrials after the juries, 
composed entirely of whites, were unable to reach a verdict.149  At the 
time, Beckwith’s actions and status made him something of an iconic 
figure amongst segregationists, such that Mississippi Governor Ross 
Barnett attended one of his trials, even shaking Beckwith’s hand after it 
became clear that he would not be convicted.150 
Three decades later, Beckwith was convicted of the murder of 
Evers and sentenced to life in prison.151  Beckwith, while morally 
reprehensible, did not obviously represent an ongoing, direct threat to 
the public safety of his community.152  What changed over time was a 
sense in the relevant legal and political arenas that Beckwith’s status had 
to be moved from free citizen to convict, that his prior actions needed to 
be judged as criminal and reprehensible, rather than effectively 
condoned.153  As Assistant District Attorney Bobby DeLaughter 
 
 146. Editorial, A Long Time Coming: But Sometimes Justice Delayed is Still Justice, THE 
REGISTER-GUARD, June 23, 2005 at A10 (discussing the conviction of Edgar Ray Killeen for the 
murder of three civil rights workers killed four decades earlier); Eric Lichtblau, Justice Delayed, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2004, at § 4, at 2 (discussing the Justice Department’s decision to reexamine 
the killing of Emmett Till); Kevin Sack, Ex-Klansman is Found Guilty in ‘63 Bombing, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 2, 2001, at A1 (discussing the conviction of Thomas Blanton for murdering four African-
American girls in 1963). 
 147. Kevin Sack, An Alabama Prosecutor Confronts the Burden of History, N.Y. TIMES, May 
5, 2001, at A8 (profiling Doug Jones, the lead prosecutor in the case involving Thomas Blanton, and 
discussing the purposes of pursing the case). 
 148. TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1963-65, at 112-13, 
230-31, 321 (1998) (discussing the arrest and two trials of Beckwith). 
 149. Id. at 230-31, 321; ADAM NOSSITER, OF LONG MEMORY: MISSISSIPPI AND THE MURDER 
OF MEDGAR EVERS 105-09, 132-34 (Da Capo Press 2002) (1994) (describing the two mistrials of 
Beckwith in 1964). 
 150. NOSSITER, supra note 149, at 108-109 (describing Ross Barnett’s appearance at 
Beckwith’s trial). 
 151. Id. at 249-257 (describing Beckwith’s third trial). 
 152. Id. at 260. 
 153. Id. at 259-63 (discussing gradual changes in how the case against Beckwith was 
perceived, and speculating that the film, The Ghosts of Mississippi, may have helped change views 
about the case).  For a quite different example of how the law might be used to reverse past cases 
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explained, he was motivated to reopen the Beckwith case in the 1990s to 
“set things right” in the legal record, and to address “the lack of closure, 
the lack of justice [that] was still there.”154 
In rejecting Beckwith’s contemporary appeals, the Mississippi 
Supreme Court affirmed a similar viewpoint and paid tribute to the 
power of the present to shape the decisions of history.155  “Today’s 
ruling,” the Court stated, 
represents the final act of this sovereign State’s attempt to deal with a 
maelstrom born out of human conflict as old as time . . . . Final 
resolution of this conflict resulted from voices, both present and past, 
who showed the courage and will, from 1964 to 1994, to merely state 
the truth in open court. Their voices cannot be ignored. We affirm the 
finding of the [1994] jury that Byron De La Beckwith, VI murdered 
Medgar Evers on the night of June 12, 1963.156 
C. Law as an Aspirational Enterprise 
As numerous scholars have argued, our legal rules, traditions, 
institutions, and practices cannot be readily divorced from a normative 
vision of what we hope to achieve and become as both a society and 
political order.157  In order to make our legal structure coherent and 
functional, our past must be read, our present must be structured, and our 
future must be planned for in ways that help to achieve these ideals.158 
This “aspirational” element of legalism can be found in a wide 
 
and public perceptions, see Associated Press, State Asked to Pardon “Witches,” REPUBLICAN AM., 
Oct. 21, 2006, available at http://www.rep-am.com/story.php?id=14262, which discusses citizens’ 
efforts to obtain state pardons from the Connecticut Board of Pardons and Paroles for individuals 
executed as witches in the 17th century. 
 154. Mississippi Justice, UNIV. MISS. LAW CTR. NEWS, Fall 1999, 
http://www.olemiss.edu/depts/law_misc/feturMsA.htm; see BOBBY DELAUGHTER, NEVER TOO 
LATE: A PROSECUTOR’S STORY OF JUSTICE IN THE MEDGAR EVERS CASE 25, 292-95 (2001) 
(discussing his reasons for prosecuting the Beckwith case, including his motivation to reopen and 
cleanse the “old wound” left by Beckwith’s unsuccessful prior prosecution). 
 155. De La Beckwith v. Mississippi, 707 So. 2d 547, 604 (Miss. 1997). 
 156. Id. 
 157. See, e.g., SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS 10 (1984) (laying 
out an “aspirational” theory of constitutionalism); Mark A. Graber, Our (Im)Perfect Constitution, 51 
REV. POL. 86, 86 (1989) (identifying “perfect constitutionalism” with the proposition that “the 
Constitution requires that our society conform to the best principles of human governance”); Robin 
West, The Aspirational Constitution, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 241, 261-64 (1993) (discussing the 
“aspirational Constitution” by comparing it with a more conservative, retrospective “adjudicated 
Constitution”). 
 158. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 8, 14, 72 (1996) (discussing aspirationalism in the context of the Constitution’s 
Third Amendment). 
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array of institutions and practices.  The U.S. Constitution’s Preamble, for 
example, promises the political gifts of “a more perfect Union” and 
“Justice” not only to the present generation but to the future 
“posterity.”159  Case law recurrently features arguments that laws must 
be interpreted with an eye towards improving the moral conditions of the 
nation now and into the future.  As noted previously, Trop v. Dulles160 is 
famously centered on an understanding of the “evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”161 
Aspirational accounts of law tend to be prescriptive as well as 
descriptive.162  We should try to fashion the most just and attractive legal 
system, and, so the argument frequently goes, we also have a long 
history of striving toward this end.163  Seen in this light, the necessity of 
reconsidering and sometimes reworking our legal past becomes clearer.  
While many of our longstanding institutions and traditions reflect our 
efforts to become a normatively better nation, they are often 
imperfect.164  Aspirational thinkers are, therefore, keenly interested in 
how we might marshal and preserve our traditions, but they are also 
committed to recasting the past, and when necessary, to forgetting and 
forsaking elements of our history if this will advance our efforts to 
improve ourselves and achieve a morally superior future.165 
While there are many variants of this aspirational account, Ronald 
Dworkin’s writings on what he calls legal “naturalism” are especially 
instructive.166  According to Dworkin, the great task of a legal interpreter 
 
 159. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 160. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
 161. Id. at 101; see also Bruce Peabody, Recovering the Political Constitution: Nonjudicial 
Interpretation, Judicial Supremacy, and the Separation of Powers 25-30 (Aug. 2000) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas at Austin) (on file with author) (discussing elements of 
constitutional interpretation by nonjudicial officials that have an aspirational character). 
 162. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, “Natural” Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165, 165 (1982) 
(outlining an approach to legal interpretation in which judges must interpret law with an eye on 
arriving at both the best fit with existing legal materials and the most morally justifiable opinion). 
 163. See id. 
 164. See, e.g., Gerald J. Postema, Integrity: Justice in Workclothes, in DWORKIN AND HIS 
CRITICS: WITH REPLIES BY DWORKIN 285, 296 (Justine Burley ed., 2004) (discussing how Dworkin 
suggests that an interpreter deal with past social and legal “mistakes”). 
 165. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 93 (1986) (“The law of a community is the scheme of 
rights and responsibilities that meet that complex standard: they license coercion because they flow 
from past decisions of the right sort”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT 
CONSTITUTIONS DO 67-93 (2001) (distinguishing between “preservative” and “transformative” 
constitutions and identifying the latter as attempting “not to preserve an idealized past but to point 
the way toward an ideal future”); TUSHNET, supra note 56, at 17-30 (discussing argument about the 
conditions under which political officials should ignore the courts and legal precedent on 
constitutional matters). 
 166. DWORKIN, supra note 15, at 288-90 (discussing “naturalism” in legal theory). 
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entails showing “the facts of history in the best light he [or she] can.”167  
Judges should compare “two pictures of the judicial past to see which 
offers a more attractive picture from the standpoint of political morality” 
and they should then select that interpretation which comes “as close to 
the correct ideals of a just legal system as possible.”168  For Dworkin, 
and other “aspirationalists,” the core of legal analysis entails integrating 
and adjusting the past on terms favorable to our present and future 
goals.169 
D. Law as a Formal System 
Law is a formal enterprise in the sense that it is more rule-bound 
and structured than, say, the decision making processes typically found 
in families or groups of friends.170  One effect of this formality is that 
legal judgments about past events follow a distinctive (and often 
delayed) timeline relative to other social and political processes.171  The 
proverbial “court of public opinion,” for example, is famously more 
immediate and impetuous than the courts of our legal system. 
The lag inherent in “legal time” creates disjunctures with other 
forms of decision making.172  Given law’s binding and authoritative 
character, when legal decisions are handed down, they can have the 
effect of dramatically reordering and even transforming our expectations 
 
 167. Dworkin, supra note 162, at 169.  While Dworkin emphasizes judges as legal interpreters, 
he recognizes that other figures, including citizens, may participate in reading law as well.  Id. 
 168. Id. at 168, 172. 
 169. DWORKIN, supra note 15, at 25-26, 36, 44-45, 67-68, 71-80, 82-90, 96-97 (arguing that 
the law consists of inherited legal rules, but also moral principles and ideals of which the rules are 
but an imperfect expression).  Some readers may object to this characterization of Dworkin’s 
philosophy, noting that some of his writing emphasizes the degree to which we (and legal 
interpreters) are bound by the past.  For example, Dworkin offers the famous “chain novel” analogy 
to suggest that a proper legal interpreter must make sense of and reconcile past legal decisions just 
as a “chain novel” author must take stock of what has already been written when inheriting his or 
her manuscript.  DWORKIN, supra note 165, at 228-38 (setting out the “chain novel” example).  But 
even while constrained by the past, later chain novel authors (and judges) can exert tremendous 
power over what was written before them.  Id.  Consider, for example, the transformative power 
possessed by an author who is sent a nearly completed Romeo and Juliet, but who decides to turn 
the play into a comedy or traditional romance by having the two protagonists live happily together, 
rather than meeting an unfortunate demise.  See also Lindquist & Cross, supra note 14, at 1173 
(arguing that increasing the volume of pertinent precedent may actually free judges to pursue their 
ideological preferences as opposed to being bound down by legal rules). 
 170. See, e.g., PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES 
FROM EVERYDAY LIFE 76-77; 213-19 (1998) (contrasting the formalism and distinctive sense of 
time in law with the characteristics of “everyday life”). 
 171. See id. 
 172. See id. 
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and views about prior events, even those long past.173  As the example of 
De La Beckwith attests, new evidence, along with new assessments of a 
case’s meaning, importance, and prospects, can revivify legal 
proceedings and judgments previously deemed settled.174  Political 
communities of the present revisit and alter past legal decisions, with the 
effect of not only purging erroneous legal statements but transforming 
the identity of past acts and actors.175 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Article is founded on a presumption that, perhaps contrary to 
initial expectations, it is intellectually productive to think of the present 
as having an impact on the past―in ways that go beyond mere 
(re)interpretation.  Assuming that this general argument about 
chronological disorder and the law has some traction, what are the stakes 
involved? 
One answer to this query is that the approach laid out in this piece 
can assist us in grappling with, and profitably rethinking, trenchant 
 
 173. See id.  Present day legal and political orders can also transform and condition the terms 
under which we gain access to and construct the past.  One of the more dramatic examples of this 
occurred when President George W. Bush used an executive order to alter the terms under which 
presidential records were made available to the public.  Among other effects, Bush’s order allowed 
former Presidents, their heirs, and other designated representatives to block access to prior 
presidential records.  See Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege in an Era of Polarized Politics, in 
EXECUTING THE CONSTITUTION: PUTTING THE PRESIDENT BACK INTO THE CONSTITUTION 96-98 
(Christopher S. Kelley ed., 2001) (discussing Executive order 13,223 and its effects on the 
Presidential Records Act); Todd J. Gillman, SMU Pressed to Fight Bush’s Secrecy: Historians Ask 
School to Reject Presidential Library Unless Bush Voids Privacy Order, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, 
Feb. 5, 2007, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/localnews/stories/ 
020507/dnnatbushsecrecy.1f9a953.html. 
 174. Other examples also demonstrate how decisions made in the present can modify the legal 
status of decisions made in the past.  See Richard B. Bernstein, The Sleeper Wakes: The History and 
Legacy of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 497, 497, 499, 504-08, 541-42 
(1992) (discussing the revival and eventual ratification of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment over a 
two hundred year period).  See generally Sanford Levinson, Authorizing Constitutional Text: On the 
Purported Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 101, 101-08 (1994); Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh 
Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 678-79 (1993). 
 175. See BOOTH, supra note 142, at 142 (discussing the 1997 trial of Maurice Papon “a full 
fifty-three years after the events it was concerned with,” and describing the trial as one that 
“annihilated that distance and with it the ‘regularization’ that the passage of time seemed to have 
won for Papon”); French, supra note 7, at 700-701 (discussing court reversals and trials as examples 
of “time reversal”).  In some contexts, this transformation is quite literal and concrete.  See, e.g., 
STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST EXPLORES THE 
HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 25 (2005) (describing how after the changing of an IRS reporting 
rule “seven million American children suddenly disappeared” because they were no longer listed on 
tax forms). 
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debates in both the academy and public affairs.  Stated somewhat 
differently, we can gain distinctive analytic leverage on a number of 
important, enduring legal problems by appreciating the extent to which 
they turn on our ability to reconcile and assess today’s hold on the 
past.176 
One of the central controversies in American constitutionalism, for 
example, involves the search for an appropriate methodology of 
constitutional interpretation.177  An enormous portion of this scholarly 
terrain has been overrun by battles about the supposed superiority or 
defect of one interpretive modality relative to others.178  This sometimes 
tired discussion can be usefully reconfigured and perhaps advanced by 
setting it against the analytic framework of this Article. 
Take the case of the ceaseless debate between originalists179 and 
those espousing some variant of the idea of a “living constitution.”180  
Much of the criticism of both approaches to construing constitutional 
issues can be traced to their respective shortcomings in providing a 
means of bridging the past with the concerns of the present.  Thus, as 
Professor Farber contends, 
What is wrong with originalism is that it seeks to block judges from 
even considering . . . later developments, which on their face seem so 
clearly relevant to [assessing constitutional questions, such as] the 
legitimacy of federal gun control efforts.  But try as they may, it seems 
unlikely that judges can avoid being influenced by these realities.181 
In this view, without some account of how to integrate present day 
concerns and developments, originalism threatens to be irrelevant or 
disingenuous as a theory of constitutional interpretation.182  The notion 
of a “living constitution,” a traditional counterpoint to originalism, 
seems to offer the promise of some systematic explanation of how the 
 
 176. See Harrison, supra note 16, at 1601 (“Much constitutional theorizing . . . is about the 
relationship between the present and the past.”). 
 177. See HUHN, supra note 101, at 13-16 (setting out five different kinds of argument generally 
accepted by the legal community, each with its own “structure” and supporting evidence); SCALIA, 
supra note 106, at 37-41, 62-73, 103-09, 112-13, 137-40 (discussing various approaches to and 
controversies involving constitutional interpretation); SUNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 50-59, 68-72, 
79-84, 87-89 (outlining different bases for constitutional interpretation). 
 178. SUNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 50-59, 68-72, 78-84, 87-89. 
 179. Id. at 87-89, 117 (describing “originalism”). 
 180. Jack M. Balkin, Alive and Kicking: Why No One Truly Believes in a Dead 
Constitution, SLATE, Aug. 29, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2125226 (“We are all living 
constitutionalists now.”). 
 181. Farber, supra note 65, at 192. 
 182. See id. at 192-93. 
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norms and expectations of a developing society should influence our 
inherited, supreme law.  But as Chief Justice Rehnquist has noted, “the 
phrase ‘living Constitution’ has about it a teasing imprecision that makes 
it a coat of many colors.”183  While nobody wants to espouse support for 
a “dead” Constitution,184 the particular character of the living and 
evolutionary variant―and how it supplies the purported defects of 
originalism―is a subject that has yet to generate much consensus or 
analytic precision.185  More systematically mapping the different ways in 
which we meaningfully regard the current constitutional order as 
influencing past legal structures and traditions would provide at least a 
prompt for pressing proponents of both “originalism” and the “living 
constitution” to elaborate and defend these accounts.186 
Beyond helping to shift the existing lines of discussion about 
interpretive methodology, more extensive inquiry into the circumstances 
in which present day legal structures and decisions disrupt traditional 
chronology may assist us in understanding and reconciling tensions 
between judicial independence and democratic rule.  In recent years, 
controversial decisions from the bench,187 the activism of the Rehnquist 
Court,188 and partisan division over the judicial confirmation process189 
have stoked high profile criticism of the U.S. judiciary.190  While 
perhaps not initially obvious, many of these attacks are ultimately fueled 
by anxieties about how extensively, and under what conditions, we allow 
the present to claim and control the legacies of the past. 
Part of conservatives’ objection to “activist” courts, for example, is 
 
 183. William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, in JUDGES ON JUDGING, supra 
note 101, at 141. 
 184. See Balkin, supra note 180; Levinson, supra note 27, at 13 (“It is hard to find anyone who 
is truly willing to reject [the notion of a living constitution], given that the alternative seems to be a 
dead Constitution.”). 
 185. Levinson, supra note 27, at 13-14. 
 186. This does not presume that such a task is straightforward or without controversy; there is 
considerable debate amongst legal historians and other scholars about the standards for “mapping” 
the past and how we ought to regard, construct, and understand the relationship between the present 
and the past. 
 187. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969-70 (Mass. 2003) 
(upholding marriage rights for same-sex couples); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 
U.S. 1 (2004) (reversing, on procedural grounds, a Circuit Court decision finding the Pledge of 
Allegiance violated First Amendment guarantees of religious freedom).   
 188. See Peabody, supra note 107, at 270 (2006) (discussing the Rehnquist Court’s activism). 
 189. Emery G. Lee, The Federalist in an Age of Faction: Rethinking Federalist No. 76 on the 
Senate’s Role in the Judiciary Confirmation Process, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 235, 237 (2004) 
(discussing recent partisan strategies in the judicial confirmation process). 
 190. See Peabody, supra note 107, at 324-326 (summarizing the results of a study examining 
efforts to limit the Supreme Court’s subject matter jurisdiction from 1981-2003). 
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their concern that judges are reconfiguring and appropriating the 
nation’s history in pursuit of individual policy preferences and partisan 
agendas.191  Thus, in introducing The Congressional Accountability for 
Judicial Activism Act192 (a measure that would have allowed Congress to 
reverse constitutional judgments of the Supreme Court), Congressman 
Ron Lewis decried how the judiciary had taken “upon itself the singular 
ability to legislate.”193  The actions of the courts, he warned, “usurp the 
will of the governed . . . by allowing . . . a select few . . . to conclusively 
rule on issues that are radically reshaping the societal traditions of our 
great Nation.”194 
As suggested, by infusing legal research with more systematic 
analyses of different sequences of time and causality, scholars will 
arguably gain new purchase on these and other recurring problems 
facing our polity.  Moreover, the analytic framework provided by this 
piece offers an abstraction that is less politically freighted and 
potentially more revealing than some traditional sources of political 
inquiry.  For example, asking judicial nominees to address how they 
envision the relationship between present and past may be less 
threatening―and, as a consequence, more intellectually profitable―than 
directly probing their views about particular cases, lines of doctrine, or 
even interpretive methodologies. 
In its broadest terms, this Article urges scholars, especially in the 
legal academy, to reconsider their largely settled and unexamined views 
about how time is structured, and how the sequence of time affects our 
description and assessment of legal phenomena.195  In advocating for this 
approach, I call, in effect, for more cross-fertilization between traditional 
scholarship on law and the subfield of American politics known as 
 
 191. See Bruce G. Peabody, Legislating from the Bench: A Definition and a Defense, 11 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 185, 187-88 (2007). 
 192. H.R. 3073, 104th Cong. (2005). 
 193. Press Release, House of Representative Ron Lewis, Accountability for Judicial Activism 
Act Introduced in House (Mar. 9, 2004), available at http://www.house.gov/list/press/ky02_lewis/ 
SCOTUS.html. 
 194. Id.  Interestingly, and somewhat paradoxically, Lewis indicated that the Court’s failings 
could be attributed, in part, to how far it had become “disconnected from the values of everyday 
Americans.”  Id.  One reading of this statement is that Lewis endorsed justices who would explicitly 
take stock of the current climate in addressing precedent and other inherited legal structures. 
195 Some of these issues may start to be addressed in the emerging scholarship looking at the 
intersection of law and neuroscience.  See, e.g., Adam J. Kolber, Therapeutic Forgetting: The Legal 
and Ethical Implications of Memory Dampening, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1561, 1566 (2006) (analyzing 
the “novel legal and ethical issues that could be presented by memory-dampening technology”).  
Among other implications, Professor Kolber’s research suggests that what we regard as the past 
could be altered, perhaps permanently, by the use of drugs like propranolol.  Id. at 1225-26.   
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“American political development” (APD).196  Generally speaking, 
scholars in this latter tradition seek distinctive insights about our 
political order by situating it “in time”―that is, by taking seriously its 
historical and developmental character.197 
For example, in their recent work, The Search for American 
Political Development,198 Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek urge us 
to turn our attention away from thinking of public affairs in terms of 
“who gets what, when, and how.”199  Instead, they suggest, we should 
reflect more carefully on how political practitioners ask themselves 
variations of the deceptively simple question “what time is it?”200  This 
query represents a search, among other things, for a sense of whose 
political stars are rising and setting, and what emergent political interests 
and concerns will be in ascendance on the next day.201 
This is a fine question to ask as we try to plumb the depths of 
American political and legal life.  But, as this Article suggests, the 
question assumes too much.  Sometimes the clock of our political and 
legal life may be broken or even running backwards.  In addition to 
asking “what time is it,” we need to ask an even more naïve and 
disarming query: “how do we tell time?” 
 
 196. ORREN & SKOWRONEK, supra note 7, at 1-5, 35, 75 (discussing the origins of and 
resurgence of interest in “American political development”). 
 197. Id. at 1 (discussing the “theoretical precept” behind American political development: 
“because a polity in all its different parts is constructed historically, over time, the nature and 
prospects of any single part will be best understood within the long course of political formation”). 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 195-96 (discussing how the emphasis of APD complements scholars’ examination 
of the question “who gets what?”). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 195 (arguing that asking “What time is it?” represents an essential “time question” 
for scholars and politicians that is “inextricably tied to political action; it affirms the value and 
efficacy of political engagements.  The normative commitments implicit in the question are, first, to 
political conflict as a vital human activity and then to the potential that these conflicts have for 
bringing about durable changes in governing.”). 
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